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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
MARY COELHO, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Case No. 930350-CA 
v. : Priority No. 16 
ALCIDES J. COELHO, : 
: District Court 11093 
Defendant/Appellee, : 
ooOoo 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 7, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals filed its Memorandum Decision in the 
appeal taken by the Plaintiff and Appellant, Mary Coelho, from the decision of the trial court. 
The Defendant and Appellee is Alcides J. Coelho. 
This Court's decision, among other things, affirmed the trial court's award of one year 
of alimony to Mrs. Coelho. The decision also affirmed the trial court's allocation of the parties' 
IRS liability and the equity line second mortgage. Mrs. Coelho petitions this Court for rehearing 
with respect only to its decision as to these issues. 
SUMMARY OF POINTS OF LAW AND FACT WHICH 
THE COURT HAS OVERLOOKED 
Mrs. Coelho petitions this Court to rehear and reconsider its decision to affirm the trial 
court's award limiting her alimony to a period of one year and to affirm the allocation of debts 
and taxes between the parties based upon the following points of law and facts which were 
overlooked or misapprehended by this Court: 
1. The Court's affirmance of the duration of the alimony award in this case is 
directly in conflict with preceding cases in which the parties' respective incomes were grossly 
disparate and in which the parties had been married a relatively long period of time. For 
example, see Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991); Rappleve v. Rappleve. 
855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. The income of the parties in evidence at trial, and in fact included in the trial 
court's Findings of Fact, demonstrates a gross disparity in the parties' respective earning abilities 
sufficient to justify an award of permanent alimony to Mrs. Coelho. 
3. The facts in evidence at trial established that Mr. Coelho's historically ability, and 
his income, over the last three years of the marriage, was substantial in comparison to Mrs. 
Coelho's earnings for the same period. 
4. This Court's decision fails to recognize the ample and uncontroverted evidence 
presented at trial of Mrs. Coelho's present ability to earn an income sufficient to maintain 
herself without support from Mr. Coelho. 
5. This Court's decision affirms the trial court's speculative determination that, after 
one year, Mrs. Coelho's circumstances would have changed sufficiently and she would no longer 
need alimony from Mr. Coelho. 
6. This Court's decision affirms the trial court's equal division of the parties' tax 
liability and the payment of the equity line second mortgage, despite the fact that, without 
alimony from the Defendant, the Plaintiff had limited ability to pay debts from the marriage. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The parties were married for sixteen years. During the marriage, three children were 
bom to the parties, Sara, now 15 years of age, bom August 7, 1978; Tony, now 13 years of 
age, bom August 19, 1980; and Emily, now 7 years of age, bom September 29, 1986. (R.2, 
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' - f the trial, the parties stipulated that the two youngest children would remain in Mrs. 
i mi J i ndy , mil Mi ml lllht o l d e s t i l u h l \ \ ould remain in the custody of Mr. Coelho. 
After the parties married, Mrs. Coelho did not complete her college education as an art 
major < She held various jobs, in addition to being a full-time 
homemaker and mother. (Tr.p 73, lines 5-i s 
a real estate agent during the 1980's (Tr„; * * ink- h-1 /). as a ski repairer (Tr.p 73, line 8), 
i , L " II '.) 
At the time of trial, Mrs. Coelho was a full-time pre-nursing student. (Tr.p. 81, lines 3-
>urs per week at two jobs, one as a ski instructor (seasonal) 
• • . 80, lines 23), and the other as a trainer in a center for handicapped adults. (Tr.p. 80, line 
23) I laintiff s gross monthly combined earnings from the two jobs were approximately $1,329. 
(Ir.p. 80-83, Exhibits U9 u) 
Mr. Coelho is a contractor' and ran his own business, Coelho Construction Company, 
I,*...,.. * *L\L . ..iv. parties' 
marriage, before deductions for necessary and discretionary business expenses, were $69,032 
in 1990 (Exhil it S ; $ 76,95' II i , 11 S S 1 (Exhibit .. • .„./. l o • *c> in I^L. (Exhibit J P A/r-. 
Coelho's business expenses, as shown on the tax returns (Exhibits 8, 9, 10), included deductions 
for depreciation, use of personal residence as an office, telephone charges, and entertainment. 
At the time of trial, Mr. Coelho was still self-employed, but proffered that his projected income 
for 1993 would be less than his 1992 net schedule "C" income of $95,346. (Tr.p. 124, line 24) 
Mrs. Coelho testified at ti ial that 1 ler ear nings as a i eal estate agent 1 lad flu icti lated gi eatly 
and that in the one year in which she had substantial earnings from sales, 1985, it was due to 
the fact that she had received a very large commission on the sale of one property. (Tr.p. 75, 
lines 15-20) The commission was paid to Mrs. Coelho over three years, with her receiving the 
largest portion and $10,000 a year for the following two years. (Tr. p. 75, lines 23-24) In 
subsequent years, her earnings dropped dramatically, and the increasing needs of the children 
demanded that she spend more and more time at home attending to their needs. (Tr.p. 76; lines 
4-10) Mrs. Coelho also testified that her average net earnings, including extra amounts earned 
during the busy Christmas ski season, were $1,121.54 per month (Exhibit 15), and that her 
monthly expenses, for herself and two of the parties' three children, were $3,560.00. (Exhibit 
14) Mrs. Coelho testified that she-had a monthly shortfall, between the amount of income she 
could generate through her own efforts and the expenses for herself and the two children, of 
$2,438.46. (Tr.p. 85, line 11) 
At trial, Mr. Coelho did not testify, but his counsel proffered his testimony to the court, 
including Mr. Coelho's claim that, while 1992 was a very good year (Tr.p. 125, line 4), he 
believed he would not make as much in 1993 and he had, in fact, received no income for the 
first month of 1993. Mrs. Coelho's counsel was not allowed to cross-examine Mr. Coelho 
regarding his testimony because of the time limitations imposed by the court. However, Mrs. 
Coelho took the position that the court should find that Mr. Coelho's monthly income averaged 
over the years 1989 through 1992 was $6,500. Mr. Coelho's counsel proffered at trial that his 
living expenses were $3,490 per month. (Exhibit 25) 
The trial court, ruling from the bench, found that Mrs. Coelho's income was the amount 
of $1,500 per month (Tr.p. 138, line 25), and that Mr. Coelho's income was $5,000 per month. 
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Tr r 136, line 24) The court awarded alimony to Mrs. Coelho in the amount of $1,000 per 
The trial court also ordered Mrs. Coelho to pay one-half of the parties' 1992 tax liability, 
despite the fact that the parties had not resided together at all during that entire year and despite 
the obvious disparity in the parties' earning abilities. 
Finally, the trial court also ordered the entire balance owing on the equity line second 
iiuirlyajj.L 1 In |i iiiilll In mi lli |||ii ill Il lln i ili nl llii |nilii • iiesiikm t linns IIBI|LIII IIIJJ Mi ;. 
Coelho to pay one-half of the amount, despite the fact that several thousand dollars of the 
balance were incurred .x , «,. his temporary support obligation. 
ARGUMENT 
¥ 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION NOT TO AWARD PERMANENT ALIMONY TO MRS. COELHO 
'-1., - Jourt's decision in the instant case is in direct conflict with its reasoning in the case 
of Thronson \. Fhronson, supra, as well at> oilic - i 
the trial court's award of alimony for a duration of only year, rhe following facts have a 
significant impact ::»i:i tl le cli u ati :)i:t of tl le alimony a\ \ ai ell: 
1. The parties were married for 16 years; 
2. "i iiv ng during their marriage; 
3. The parties had substantial disparity in their earnings; 
4. Klis Coelho's monthly expenses substantially exceeded her earnings; 
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5. Mrs. Coelho's future earnings, even if she were able to increase her income as 
the trial court speculated, would be insufficient to meet her needs and she would still have a 
substantial shortfall. 
Despite these facts, this Court in its decision in this case stated that it did "not find the 
award of alimony for one year at $1,000 per month . . . to be an abuse of discretion." This 
conclusion overlooks significant facts as well as misapplies the case law. 
Specifically, this Court has repeatedly held that the trial court must consider three factors 
in determining an alimony award, (1) the financial condition and needs of the party seeking 
alimony; (2) that party's ability to produce sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) the 
ability of the other party to provide support. See Naranio v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 
(Utah App. 1988) (citing English v. English. 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). 
In the recent case of Thronson v. Thronson, supra, this Court reversed the trial court's 
award of alimony, holding that the trial court "abused its discretion in making the alimony non-
permanent, i.e., for one year." The discussion that followed focused on the parties' respective 
earning abilities, even assuming that Mrs. Thronson obtained full time employment, her needs, 
and the shortfall between the two. In Thronson, this Court stated: 
Accordingly, [Mrs. Thronson] is not capable of meeting her needs, she 
requires $9,400 annually to meet her needs, even when employed on a 
full-time basis. Thus, she will require the $800 per month ($9,600 
annually) alimony for the foreseeable future. Otherwise, she will face a 
substantial income shortfall compared to her needs. . . . These findings 
warrant an award of permanent alimony. The trial court abused its 
discretion in limiting the alimony award to one year. Rasband v. 
RasbaM, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah App. 1988). 
(Emphasis added.) 
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In the instant case, the trial court made the following finding: 
, , The court having reviewed and considered all the evidence, 
finds that based upon the current circumstances defendant has an 
earning capacity of $5,000 per month and plaintiff has an earning 
capacity of $1,500 per month, and the court's findings related to 
support and alimony are based upon these income expectancies. 
Using the Court's analysis from,., the Ihronson < JIM" lin , n is < Ir.n ilui ilir (nil \ «, nil 
abused its discretion in awarding Mrs. Coelho alimony for a period of one year. First of all, 
ihr I i, mil tnunil tli.it .Iir vur iii.ihl I i ,i,i!iiiii« *M illll in i 11111111 ml In .tntl IULI mnnlhh expenses 
were $3,560.00. Even adding the child support award of $619 per month to her earnings, Mrs. 
Coelho had, a monthlj shortfall . Court speculated Mrs. Coelho could. 
"reestablish her income based on her demonstrated historical earning capacity, and limited the 
$1,000 monthly award to one year. 
B) c :>mparisoi -»s writ' \\ 1111,11 1 1, 
despite the fact that that finding was based solely on his counsel's proffer of his projected 
earning u .; ,*.n ... that income, 
however, Mr. Coelho had nearly $4,200 of gross earnings after the payment of child support 
to support himself and one of the parties' children. By comparison, Mrs. Coelho had only 
$2,119 to provide for herself and two of the parties' children, or approximately one-half of that 
amount. Even assuming that she would have been able to increase her earnings, as found by 
the court, from $1,500 to $2,500 per month, she wouk d 
of alimony from Mr. Coelho. This would force her to provide for a household of three with 
I."' . ihll.i il flu • Hi I I I I„„ MI .In. .1.1 l I 
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Unless this Court reverses the trial Court's award of alimony for a period of only one 
year, Mrs. Coelho stands to suffer the same consequence that Mrs. Thronson would have 
suffered had this Court not reversed the trial court's limited award of alimony in that case and 
made it a permanent award. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ALLOCATION OF MARITAL DEBT AND TAX LIABILITY 
Despite the fact that, even with an award of alimony of $1,000, Mrs. Coelho's ability 
to pay the equity line second mortgage and the parties' 1992 tax liability was substantially 
disparate from Mr. Coelho's ability, the trial court ordered her to pay one-half of the tax 
liability, as well as one-half of the equity line second mortgage from her share of the home 
proceeds. This was an abuse of discretion for two reasons: 
First, the parties did not reside together at all during the entire 1992 year, and Mr. 
Coelho paid support to Mrs. Coelho pursuant to the court's temporary Order. To require Mrs. 
Coelho to pay one-half of the tax liability, when she did not benefit in any way whatsoever from 
Mr. Coelho's failure to pay it, as the support she received from him was a certain sum every 
month, was simply inequitable. The tax liability was incurred after the parties' separation, and, 
like other debts incurred subsequent to the time divorcing parties separate, should have been paid 
by the party who incurred the debt. 
Second, Mr. Coelho used several thousand dollars of the money owing on the equity line 
second mortgage to pay his temporary support obligation, and that amount should have been paid 
by Mr. Coelho from his share of the home proceeds before the remaining balance was split 
8 
between the parties. At the very least, Mrs. Coelho's share of the net equity should not have 
been reduced by that portion of the loan incurred only by Mr. Coelho. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court's decision in this case is inconsistent with its previous decisions in that it has 
affirmed an award of limited alimony that is inappropriate based upon the length of the parties' 
marriage and the disparity in their respective incomes. The trial court's findings as to the 
parties' respective incomes constitute a sufficient basis upon which to base an award of 
indeterminable alimony. The trial court's award limiting Mrs. Coelho's award of alimony to 
one year should not have been affiimed.^^^^ 1 
Similarly, the trial court's orders allocating an equal division of the tax liability and an 
equal repayment of the equity line second mortgage without any offset for amounts incurred by 
Mr. Coelho, should not have been affirmed by this Court. 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests a rehearing of this matter and a 
modification of this Court's decision reversing the limited award of alimony and awarding Mrs. 
Coelho permanent alimony that should terminate only upon her remarriage, cohabitation or 
death, and a more equitable order with regard to the payment of the tax liability and the equity 
line second mortgage. 
DATED this 21st day of June, 1994. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant. 
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CERTIFICATION 
HELEN E CHRISTIAN, counsel for Petitioner in this action, who, being duly sworn, 
does hereby certify that the foregoing Petition is presented in good faith, supported by substantial 
case law and authority, and is not being presented for purposes of delay. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21st day of June, 1994. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: 
Notaiy Public 
USTINEl KRI I WIMMER I 
9 Exchange Place #722 • 
Salt Lata (Sty. Utah 8 4 i r 
My Commission Expire- I 
June 17.199*f a 
ofUtah J 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING were duly hand delivered, addressed to: 
B. L. Dart, Esq. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
DATED this 21st day of June, 1994. 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
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